Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2006

The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights
David Cole
Georgetown University Law Center, cole@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/417

37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 627-658 (2006)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Faculty Publications

July 2006

The Idea of Humanity:
Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights
37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 627-658 (2006)

David Cole

Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
cole@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/417/
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920508
Posted with permission of the author

THE IDEA OF HUMANITY: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS
David Cole∗
“The alien was to be protected, not because he was a member
of one’s family, clan, or religious community; but because he was a
human being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered the idea of
humanity.”1 So wrote Hermann Cohen, a Jewish philosopher, in a
19th-century commentary on the Bible. While Cohen was interpreting
a very different source of authority, his words point toward the
critical moral underpinnings of an international human rights
strategy for furthering the rights of foreign nationals. Because they
are predicated on one’s status as a human being, rather than on one’s
affiliation with any particular nation-state, international human
rights are both most relevant to, and most tested by, the treatment of
foreign nationals.
In a landmark ruling in 2004, the Law Lords of Great Britain
invalidated a statute authorizing indefinite preventive detention of
foreign nationals who were suspected terrorists.2 The Court found
that the statute conflicted with the obligation not to discriminate
against foreign nationals, an obligation found in the European
Convention on Human Rights, which Britain had incorporated into

∗
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank Sean Abouchedid
and Marian Fowler, my research assistants at Georgetown, for invaluable
assistance in the research for this article. I presented this paper to a working
group on human rights sponsored by Notre Dame Law School and at a human
rights symposium sponsored by Fribourg University in Switzerland, and
benefited greatly from the comments of the participants in both settings.
1.
H. Freedman, ed., Jeremiah, Hebrew Text & English Translation with
an Introduction and Commentary, 52 (A. Cohen, ed., the Sancio Press 1949)
(quoting Hermann Cohen).
2.
The Law Lords of Great Britain declared invalid a statute authorizing
indefinite preventive detention of foreign nationals who were suspected
terrorists. A(FC) and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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its own law in the Human Rights Act.3 The Court reasoned that a
“suspected terrorist” poses the same threat whether he is a British
citizen or a foreign national, and therefore there is no justification for
treating the two differently.4 The Law Lords’ decision is the ideal
model for the integration of human rights and immigrants’ rights.
The Court relied on international standards, made part of domestic
law, to enforce equality between all persons, regardless of
nationality.
Just six months before the Law Lords ruled, the Supreme
Court declared that the United States had violated Yaser Hamdi’s
constitutional rights by holding him as an enemy combatant for two
years without charges and without any hearing in which he could
protest his innocence and confront the evidence against him.5 The
Court rested its decision on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which bars the government from depriving “any person”
of life, liberty, or property without due process.6 Yaser Hamdi,
however, was not just any person—he was a United States citizen.
And while the Court never explained what relevance that fact had to
the constitutional inquiry (it has elsewhere stated that due process
protects all persons in the United States, regardless of citizenship
status), the Court managed to mention that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen
eleven times.7 The attitude reflected by the Court’s repeated mantra
of citizenship could not be more different from the approach adopted
by the Law Lords of Great Britain.
Are international human rights arguments likely to be
effective in advancing immigrants’ rights in the United States? There
are many reasons to be pessimistic. Despite its history as a nation of
immigrants and the ever-increasing diversity of its populace, the
United States remains a deeply parochial and nationalist culture,
and the law shares that parochialism. International human rights
arguments are often seen as the advocates’ last refuge, pulled out
only when there is no other authority to cite. In the absence of an
international forum with the power to hold the United States
accountable, and in the face of Congressional directives that the
international human rights treaties it has ratified are not “self-

3.
Id. at 22.
4.
Id. at 19.
5.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
6.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
7.
Hamdi v. Rumfeld, 542 U.S. at 509, 510, 511, 516, 524, 527, 528, 531,
532, 533, 537.
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executing,” international human rights feel aspirational, without the
force of law. It is not surprising, then, that international human
rights arguments are rarely advanced in domestic U.S. courts—in
immigration cases or elsewhere. Nor should it be surprising that in
those few instances where such arguments are broached, they are as
often as not ignored or summarily dismissed.
Yet despite these substantial obstacles, there are also reasons
to be optimistic about the potential for advancing immigrants’ rights
through international human rights. As Hermann Cohen’s quotation
implies, human rights are just that—human rights—and therefore
generally do not acknowledge distinctions between citizens and
noncitizens. The rights identified and protected in international
human rights treaties derive from human dignity, and dignity does
not turn on the type of passport or visa a person holds. Accordingly,
human rights discourse offers tremendous normative power and
potential for advancing social justice on behalf of foreign nationals in
the United States. In some sense, it would be irresponsible not to
explore that potential. And for a variety of reasons, now is an
especially propitious time for such exploration.
This essay seeks to assess the role that international human
rights law might have in the effort to protect, strengthen, and
develop legal protections for immigrants. I will first outline in more
detail the difficulties that any international human rights strategy
will confront. I will then suggest, however, that the opportunities
that this particular historical moment offers may outweigh the
dangers, and that in any event historical trends strongly suggest that
we will see increasing incorporation of international norms in the
domestic setting. Finally, I will suggest that in order to be most
effective, advocates should adopt a three-pronged strategy: advancing
modest claims of statutory construction and constitutional
interpretation in the courts; advocating more expansive conceptions
of international human rights in the political and popular realms;
and pushing for the creation of institutions and processes to bring
international human rights considerations into domestic
policymaking at the outset, before disputes arise.

I.

OBSTACLES

American law and culture pose at least three considerable
impediments to a legal or political strategy aimed at furthering
immigrants’ rights through international human rights. The first is
specific to this historical moment. The attacks of September 11
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succeeded in terrorizing the American psyche and have led to a new
wave of anti-immigration sentiment. That sentiment may make
resort to international human rights claims in this area especially
risky. The anti-immigrant feeling is in part due to the fact that all
nineteen suicide bombers were noncitizens, backed by an
international terrorist organization comprised almost entirely of
foreign nationals. But discrimination against immigrants is also
founded on the fact that, as in every other serious national security
crisis in our past, government officials have found it easier to
sacrifice the rights of non-voting foreign nationals for the purported
security of the nation than to ask voting Americans to sacrifice their
own rights and liberties in the name of promises of greater security.8
Louis Post’s description of the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920, which
rounded up thousands of foreign nationals after a series of terrorist
bombings, is equally applicable to the government’s post-9/11
response: “the delirium caused by the bombings turned in the
direction of a deportation crusade with the spontaneity of water
seeking out the course of least resistance.”9 In such situations,
deportation of foreign nationals is “the course of least resistance,”10
especially when they are viewed as “them” in the us-them dichotomy
that so often dominates public discourse and consciousness in a time
of war.
The targeting of foreign nationals has taken many forms,
from incommunicado detention and torture abroad to preventive
detention, systemic surveillance, and ethnic profiling at home. Many
of the most troubling initiatives have been undertaken through
immigration law. Bent and twisted to serve purposes it was never
designed to achieve, immigration law has led to widespread secret
arrests without charges, secret trials, denials of access to counsel,
detention without probable cause, and even the rendering of foreign
nationals to other countries for torture.11 Early in the aftermath of
9/11, Attorney General John Ashcroft discovered that the
immigration laws afforded him wide-ranging discretion—a discretion
he expanded far beyond its already capacious boundaries—to target
foreign nationals as “suspected terrorists” on little or no evidence of

8.
For development of this point, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism 72-82 (2003).
9.
Louis F. Post, The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty: A
Personal Narrative of an Historic Official Experience 307 (1923).
10.
Id. at 307.
11.
See Cole, supra note 8, at 17-82.
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involvement in anything remotely close to terrorist activity.12 Just as
traffic regulations have enabled narcotics officers to engage in
pretextual stops and searches, so immigration law has given federal
agents the pretext they need to stop, search, monitor, and interrogate
foreign nationals in the search for terrorists.
The utility of immigration law and immigrant targeting to
law enforcement officials and politicians means that invoking
international human rights in this realm presents considerable risk.
If immigration law is driven by the politics of fear and the course of
least resistance, the invocation of international human rights in this
setting may do more to harm international human rights than to
help immigration law. The incentives to target foreign nationals may
prove too powerful, and may lead courts, Congress, the executive,
and the public at large to take a rather dim view of the legal
limitations posed by international instruments. Nowhere has this
been more evident than in the Administration’s detention and
interrogation of foreign nationals abroad. The international laws of
armed conflict recognize the power of a state in wartime to hold those
fighting for the other side for the duration of the conflict, but impose
basic limits on that power, including guarantees of fair process and
prohibitions on torture and inhumane treatment.13 Claiming that
this is a new kind of war, the Administration has sought to employ
the extraordinary powers of war while evading the international law
limits on those powers, refusing until suffering defeat in the
Supreme Court to provide Guantanamo detainees with any sort of
hearing to assess their status14 and maintaining in secret Justice
Department and Pentagon memos that the international law
prohibition on torture cannot constrain the President in wartime.15 It

12.
See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The
September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (April
2003) (describing ways that the Justice Department abused immigration law to
hold foreign nationals “of interest” to the 9/11 investigation on little or no basis
for suspicion); see also Cole, supra note 8, at 17-21.
13.
See generally Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138
(establishing standards relating to the detainment of prisoners of war).
14.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
15.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto Gonzales, Regarding
Standards for Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A (Aug. 1,
2002), reprinted in Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and
the War on Terror, 115 (2004) [hereinafter Torture Memo]. Working Group
Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment
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has long been said that civil liberties are some of the first casualties
of war, but international human rights may be even earlier to go.
The second reason to be pessimistic about the effectiveness of
international human rights claims lies in the skeptical reception
such claims have long been given in the United States. Until
recently, a lawyer litigating for social change in the United States
would use international human rights arguments only after all
statutory and constitutional law arguments had failed, and even then
without much hope of actually prevailing. American legal culture has
long viewed international human rights as “mere surplusage” when
it comes to domestic law. Many assume that international human
rights norms are not likely to provide greater guarantees than does
the Constitution. Congress has often made this a self-fulfilling
prophecy by adopting reservations in ratifying international human
rights conventions providing that the treaties not be read as
mandating anything more than what American constitutional law
guarantees.16 There is a dearth of lawyers trained to employ
international human rights arguments, and judges are unaccustomed
to hearing such arguments, much less to taking them seriously. A
variety of legal doctrines erect barriers to private enforcement of
international human rights in domestic courts, and there is no
effective international legal forum for enforcement against the
United States.17 All of these circumstances combine to make

of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations (April 4, 2003),
reprinted in id. at 187.
16.
Congress adopted a reservation for Article 16 of the Convention on
Torture that the prohibition on “degrading treatment” was no more than a
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” within what the Eighth
Amendment guarantees. Resolution of Ratification of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment §I(1),
101st Cong, 136 Cong. Rec. 17491 (1990). Congress also adopted a reservation for
Article 6 of the ICCPR negating the provision against the death penalty for
minors. Resolution of Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights §I(2), 102nd Cong., 138 Cong. Rec. 4783 (1992) (enacted). See
generally Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human
Rights Treaties, 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 347 (2000) (discussing practice of treaty
reservations).
17.
See Michael Byers, The Law And Politics Of The Pinochet Case, 10
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 415, 418 (2000), for a general analysis of the difficulties
faced prosecuting international human rights violations in domestic courts. . See
also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (stating that the plaintiff
alleging participation by the Drug Enforcement Agency in his abduction from
Mexico for trial in the United States was not entitled to a remedy under the Alien
Tort Statute).
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international human rights appear illusory and utopian, not real
constraints to be taken seriously by the political or legal branches of
government.
The skepticism is evident in Supreme Court opinions. In
2004, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the Alien Tort
Statute, which had for twenty years been the principal avenue for
development of international human rights law in U.S. courts.18 The
Court limited the Alien Tort Statute to enforcement of those
international human rights norms that already have the specificity
and uniform consensus that characterized the three international
law violations recognized as affording private individuals a cause of
action at the time of the Alien Tort Statute’s enactment in 1798—
injuries against ambassadors, denial of safe conduct, and piracy.19
While the Court significantly left “the door ajar” to U.S. courts’
enforcement of such widely established international human rights
claims,20 its limitation on the types of claims that are cognizable is
likely to make U.S. courts inhospitable for the development of
international human rights claims in Alien Tort Statute lawsuits.
As I will suggest later, the Sosa decision is by no means a
fatal bar to international human rights advocates in domestic courts,
particularly where they invoke international law as a guide to the
interpretation of statutory or constitutional questions rather than as
an independent source of relief. But perhaps more significantly, the
Court’s reasoning for its narrow construction of the Alien Tort
Statute reflects substantial judicial discomfort with playing an active
role in the development of international human rights law. The
Court listed several reasons for construing the judicial role narrowly,
and all are likely to be cited by defendants in international human
rights cases as reasons for judicial restraint in this domain generally.
The Court noted that while it has long been recognized that the law
of nations is a part of federal common law, modern conceptions of
both common law and the role of federal courts contemplate a much
more limited role for courts than was assumed at the time of the
Framers, when it was thought that common law was found, not
made, by courts.21 The Court also reasoned that modern
jurisprudence disfavors judicially created private rights of action and
that the interpretation of international human rights will often
18.
19.
20.
21.

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 725.
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implicate matters of foreign relations best left to the political
branches.22 Moreover, the Court saw “no Congressional mandate to
seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of
nations.”23
Finally, even apart from the specific challenges posed by the
post-9/11 era, immigration law is an especially difficult arena for
advancing individual rights claims of any kind, much less those
based on international law. The Supreme Court has long
characterized the immigration power as “plenary,” and government
lawyers inevitably open their briefs in immigrants’ rights cases by
quoting decisions suggesting that the principal limits on that
“plenary power” are political, not legal, in nature.24 The Supreme
Court has only rarely declared an immigration law unconstitutional,
and the casebooks are replete with examples of injustices that would
plainly not be tolerated (legally or politically) had the victims been
U.S. citizens.25 As the Supreme Court reiterated in 2002, upholding a
statute imposing mandatory preventive detention on foreign
nationals, a practice that would never pass constitutional muster if
applied to citizens, “Congress regularly makes rules [for aliens] that
22.
Id. at 727.
23.
Id. at 728.
24.
See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595 (1952) (“[The
Court is] urged to apply some doctrine of atonement and redemption. Congress
might well have done so, but it is not for the judiciary to usurp the function of
granting absolution or pardon [for immigrants]. We cannot do so for deportable
ex-convicts, even though they have served a term of imprisonment calculated to
bring about their reformation.”); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 (1976) (“[I]n
the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); see
generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and
Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 365 (2002) (arguing that
although the Zadvydas decision purports to establish constitutional limits to
Congress’s plenary power over immigration, it is unlikely to do so in practice);
Cornelia T. L. Pillard and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny Of Plenary
Power: Judicial And Executive Branch Decision Making In Miller v. Albright,
1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (1998) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s use of a deferential
standard derived from Congress’s plenary power over immigration to evaluate
the constitutionality of a discriminatory immigration statute instead of using
heightened scrutiny); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power:
Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 925 (1994-1995)
(reviewing the development of the plenary power doctrine up to the mid-1990s
and advancing predictions for its future).
25.
See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (upholding retroactive
application of immigration laws to make a foreign national deportable for conduct
that was legal at the time he engaged in it).
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would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”26
These concerns make clear that international human rights
arguments are no magic sword in the stone for immigrants’ rights
advocates. In their own respective spheres, advancing immigrants’
rights and international human rights have been uphill battles.
Combining the two might well be dismissed as “naïve and dangerous”
idealism, as President Bush might put it.27 But as I will show in the
next section, each of the obstacles identified above simultaneously
provides an opportunity. With the right emphasis and tactics,
international human rights arguments may well prove a critical tool
in the arsenal of those who seek to advance immigrants’ rights.

II. OPPORTUNITIES
It may not always be true that the flipside of obstacle is
opportunity, but in this instance each of the phenomena described
above has a correlative benefit. First, while anti-immigrant fear and
bias pervade the post-9/11 atmosphere, the realities of waging a war
against an international organization or organizations dispersed in a
large number of countries underscore the need for global legitimacy
and have the potential to shore up arguments for respecting our
international obligations. Second, although skepticism about
international human rights remains a significant strand in American
legal culture, the trend line appears headed in the opposite direction,
toward a transnational legal justice system in which, as Harold Koh
has argued, the national and the international increasingly merge.28
In my view, we may well be in the midst of a paradigm shift on the
subject of international authority with interesting parallels to the
shift from state to federal power that the United States experienced
in the wake of the New Deal. Finally, the source of the “plenary
26.
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 (1976); see also Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003); see David Cole, Not Too Much for an Alien¸ Wash. Post,
May 7, 2003, at A3; see generally David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process
Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003 (2002) (criticizing the
contemporary practice of indefinitely detaining aliens subject to a final order of
deportation for the sole purpose of carrying out 9/11-related criminal
investigations, which have thus far proven fruitless).
27.
Commission on Presidential Debates, Second Presidential Candidates’
Debate, October 8, 2004, available at http://www.debates.org/pages/tr
ans2004c.html (criticizing John Kerry’s proposal for bilateral relations with
North Korea as “naive and dangerous”).
28.
See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 Am.
J. Int’l. L. 43, 56 (2004).
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power” of immigration has long been identified as international law
itself, and therefore international law is already implicated in the
definition and scope of that power. In the early days of the republic,
international law considered power over immigration as inherent in
sovereignty itself.29 But the evolution of international human rights
has placed significant restrictions on sovereignty, and since the
immigration power rests in significant part on international legal
foundations, it may be particularly susceptible to those restrictions.
The double-edged nature of the post-9/11 atmosphere has
been made painfully clear by the revelations of torture and other
degrading treatment at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib Prison in
Iraq, Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, and unnamed CIA
detention centers around the world.30 The path to Abu Ghraib was
paved by the Administration’s desire to push the limits of torture in
coercing detainees to talk in interrogation rooms around the world.
That desire led to a truly astounding opinion from the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC)—supposedly the legal conscience of the Executive
Branch—that treated the torture prohibition as if it were a tax code,
and as if the main function of the lawyer was not to ensure that the
letter and spirit of the law be honored, but to find loopholes in the
code. 31 The OLC opinion argued that it was permissible to threaten a
detainee with death, as long as it was not a threat of “imminent
death;” that it was permissible to administer personality-altering
drugs as long as they did not “penetrate to the core of an individual’s
ability to perceive the world around him;” that infliction of mental
harm was appropriate as long as it was not “prolonged;” and that
physical pain was acceptable as long as it was not the kind of severe
pain that might accompany “organ failure.”32 It even went so far as to
argue that the President could authorize out-and-out torture in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief and that it would be
unconstitutional for international human rights treaties or federal
statutes to ban him from doing so.33 The Convention Against
Torture, which the United States has signed and ratified,

29.
See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing
Supreme Court decisions noting that immigration power stems from
international law conceptions of sovereignty) (and cases cited therein), rev’d on
other grounds, 329 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
30.
See generally Danner, supra note 15 (providing extensive reporting of
the Abu Ghraib torture scandal).
31.
See Bybee Memorandum, August 2, 2002, supra note 15.
32.
Id. at 119-25.
33.
Id. at 146-49.
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categorically forbids torture under any circumstances.34 Yet as the
Justice Department memo demonstrated, the war on terrorism
creates powerful temptations to flout international law.
Once the photos from Abu Ghraib were released worldwide,
politicians in and out of the Administration almost immediately
realized that this instance of pushing the bounds of international law
had backfired. Reactions in and around Washington sometimes
expressed concern for the injuries suffered by the Iraqi detainees, but
nearly always reserved their deepest concern for the disastrous
impact these pictures would have on American foreign policy.35 That
expression of concern illustrated what the 9/11 Commission later
noted in its report—that success in fighting terrorism turns in large
measure on perceptions of the United States held around the world.36
If we are seen as pursuing illegitimate means in the effort to keep
ourselves secure, we will suffer serious consequences, as we will find
it more difficult to obtain the cooperation we need in order to find
and incapacitate terrorist threats, and Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups will find it easier to find willing recruits to the fight against
us.
The Defense Department itself has recognized that we must
take seriously the battle for “hearts and minds.”37 That reality

34.
The Convention Against Torture provides that, “No
exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture.” UN Convention on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 (entered into force June
26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention on Torture].
35.
“[N]egligence is anything but benign in the damage it threatens to our
national security and foreign policy interests, at a particularly dangerous time.”
Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy On The Abuse Of Prisoners in U.S. Military
Custody (May 5, 2004), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/index.html; “I
think it was a failure of political judgment or public relations judgment not a
failure to do his job and see that the investigations got done and the people got
punished.” Representative James Woolsey, quoted in Online NewsHour,
Rumsfeld Under Fire (May 6, 2004) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/whi
te_house/jan-june04/rumsfeld_5-06.html.
36.
National Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report 375, 376 (2004).
37.
“The information campaign—or as some still would have it, ‘the war of
ideas,’ or the struggle for ‘hearts and minds’—is important to every war effort.”
Office of the Under Sec’y of Def. for Acquisition, Tech. & Logistics, Report of the
Def. Sci. Bd. Task Force on Strategic Commc’n 39 (September 2004), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/20
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creates an opportunity for advocates concerned about the treatment
of foreign nationals in the war on terrorism. The way we treat other
countries’ nationals is covered extensively in the foreign media, and
arguably much of the anti-American resentment so prevalent around
the world today can be attributed to the perception that the United
States is not willing to accord to “them” the dignity and respect that
international human rights demand, and is not willing to play by the
rules that international law sets out.38 Moreover, the very fact that
foreign nationals are so often the first targets of our security
initiatives makes foreign nations and foreign media potential
partners in calling attention to violations of international human
rights here at home.
Guantanamo is a perfect example. Nationals of forty-two
separate nations have been held there,39 and as a result Guantanamo
quickly became a focal point for international condemnation of the
United States’ policies in the war on terror, even in Great Britain,
our closest ally in the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq.40 The
international condemnation directed at Guantanamo, articulated in
terms of international law, in turn affected the legal landscape at
home, and very likely played a significant role in the Supreme
Court’s decision not only to hear the Guantanamo detainees’ cases,
but to resoundingly reject the Administration’s position that its
actions at Guantanamo were immune from any judicial or legal
limitations. Thus, while the war on terror makes immigrants the
likely targets of most of the worst excesses, that fact in turn makes
fundamental international norms more relevant, in both diplomatic
and legal terms.
Phrasing rights claims in the language of international
human rights may facilitate international pressure. When one
charges that the United States government has violated the First or
04-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.
38.
Cole, supra note 8, at 183-204.
39.
A Place in the Sun, Beyond the Law, Economist, May 10, 2003, at 12;
David Cole, Korematsu II?, The Nation, Dec. 8, 2003, at 6.
40.
British Law Lord John Steyn stated, “Ought the British Government to
make plain publicly and unambiguously its condemnation of the utter
lawlessness at Guantanamo Bay?” Lord Steyn also called the treatment of
prisoners “a monstrous failure of justice.” Anthony Sampson, The Damaging
Legacy Of Our Silence Over This Offshore Haven For Torturers, The Independent
(London), June 19, 2004 at 39; Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12-16, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004) (Nos. 03-343, 03-334).
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Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, foreign observers are likely to
defer to Americans on the issue. What basis does a Swiss or Saudi
citizen have to judge whether given actions violate American
constitutional norms? Where, by contrast, the charges are framed in
terms of international human rights, they speak a transnational
language, one with which citizens and lawyers from any number of
countries will feel more comfortable. There is no need to defer to the
United States, for example, on what the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights or the Geneva Conventions say. Thus,
international human rights language facilitates international moral
and legal pressure on troubling U.S. practices.
The second obstacle to international human rights
advocacy—the unfamiliarity, skepticism, or even hostility of
American judges, lawyers, and others to international law
arguments—also has a flipside. “Nationalists” opposed to the
intervention of international standards remain in significant
positions of power—see, for example, President Bush’s summary
dismissal during the 2004 presidential debates of Senator Kerry’s
suggestion of a “global test” for going to war, or see Justice Scalia’s
scathing criticism of any invocation of international or foreign court
decisions in interpreting our Constitution.41 But the path of history
toward globalization suggests that adoption of a more transnational
or international perspective is virtually inevitable.
Indeed, when historians look back at the current period, they
may well conclude that we are in the midst of a fundamental
paradigm shift on the subject of international law—akin to the shift
from state to federal power that the nation experienced in the postNew Deal era with respect to business and labor regulation under
the Commerce Clause and individual rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Just as the post-New Deal and
civil rights eras saw a shift in authority based on a recognition of the
increasing importance of uniform federal standards with respect to
the rights of workers, consumers, criminal defendants, and members
of minority groups, so too today we may be seeing a shift in attitudes
about the role of national and international law in the regulation of
business and basic human rights. Just as the integrated national

41.
George W. Bush, Remarks at the First Presidential Debate between
President George Bush and Senator John Kerry (Sept. 30, 2004) (transcript
available from The Washington Post), available at http://www.washingt
onpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_0930.html; Roper v. Simmons,
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1226-29 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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economy required more centralized national power, so the forces of
globalization today are rendering national borders less critical in the
articulation and protection of legal rights.
The New Deal transformation in American constitutional law
was so significant that Professor Bruce Ackerman has labeled it a
“constitutional moment,” likening it to constitutional amendments
that fundamentally alter the understanding of our governing
framework.42 Prior to the New Deal, business regulation was thought
to be a matter for local and state regulation, and Congress was
authorized to act only when it sought to regulate commerce that was
actually interstate.43 The Court accordingly struck down a range of
federal statutes designed to protect workers from exploitation by
employers. Similarly, protection of individual rights was generally
considered a matter for the states. The Court generally viewed the
Bill of Rights as applying only to the federal government, and not to
the states.44 But the post-New Deal era saw both of these rules
reversed. The Court, recognizing that we now had an integrated
national economy, acknowledged Congress’s “plenary power” to
regulate any conduct that Congress might rationally believe affected
interstate commerce.45 Also, the Court increasingly interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to “incorporate” the
specific protections of the Bill of Rights and apply them to the
states.46 Both developments had the effect of harmonizing the
obligations imposed on federal and state governments and giving the
federal government substantially greater power, in recognition of the
need for federal protection of the rights of workers, consumers, and
minority groups.
There are signs of a similar shift toward globalization and
international human rights today. The international human rights
movement, a product of the past fifty years, has grown from a
nascent idea into a vast network of international treaties,

42.
See Bruce Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law (1984).
43.
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
44.
See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
45.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
46.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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institutions, and non-governmental organizations.47 The U.N.
Declaration of Rights dates back to 1948.48 In its wake came the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 and
regional human rights treaties for the Americas, Europe, and
Africa.49 In the 1990s, Congress ratified three important human
rights treaties—the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture, and the
Convention Against All Forms of Racial Discrimination.50 Similar
trends are evident elsewhere. Great Britain has incorporated the
European Convention on Human Rights into its own domestic law by
enacting a Human Rights Act, and numerous Eastern European
countries have signed on to the European Convention on Human
Rights and its transnational enforcement regime.51 Meanwhile, here
at home, human rights non-governmental organizations have
increasingly turned their human rights scrutiny homeward, bringing
the tactics of shaming to bear on their home country in reports
criticizing the United States’ treatment of immigrants, racial
minorities, and criminal defendants, especially those on death row.52

47.
See Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human
Rights: Visions Seen (2d ed. 2003).
48.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)(A), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 127, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
49.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 13, June 26, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
50.
ICCPR, supra note 49; Convention on Torture, supra note 34;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. C, 95-2
(1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
51.
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); all Council of Europe member
states are party to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Council of
Europe,
Chart
of
Signatures
and
Ratifications,
available
at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&
CL=ENG.
52.
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Scores of Muslim Men Jailed Without
Charge (June 27, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/
27/usdom11213.htm; Amnesty International, USA (Texas): Death Penalty: David
Martinez (July 22, 2005), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library
/Index/ENGAMR511152005?open&of=ENG-USA; Amnesty International, Report
2005, United States of America, available at http://web.amnesty.org/re
port2005/usa-summary-eng.
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These developments have not been lost on the courts. The
federal courts have entertained tort suits for violations of core human
rights norms since 1980,53 and while the Supreme Court’s Sosa
decision will slow that trend, it significantly left “the door ajar” to
such claims in the future.54 In a series of recent constitutional
decisions, over the spirited dissents of “nationalists,” the Supreme
Court has increasingly looked to international and foreign law
decisions in construing our own Constitution. In Lawrence v. Texas,
the Supreme Court cited decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights in concluding that a prohibition on same-sex sodomy violated
the right to privacy (and overturning a contrary decision from only
seventeen years earlier in which the Court had not even mentioned
the European Court of Human Rights’ decision).55 Justice Ginsburg
cited international treaty materials in her concurring opinion
upholding affirmative action in the University of Michigan Law
School case.56 In Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the Court
relied on international and foreign law developments around the
world in declaring that imposing the death penalty on juveniles and
those with mental retardation was “cruel and unusual” in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.57
Just as judicial developments in the post-New Deal and civil
rights eras reflected changes in the society at large, so too these
glimmers of attention to international human rights principles arise
in the context of globalization.58 Economic treaties like NAFTA and
the GATT and institutions like the World Trade Organization and
the European Community all point in the same direction—toward
more transnational regulation. Businesses are increasingly organized
on an international scale, and nationalist protectionism interferes

53.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
54.
Julian Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on
Terrorism, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 205, 208 (2005).
55.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
56.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
57.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Roper v. Simmons,
125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194-95 (2005); see also Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (noting consensus in the
international community against executing juveniles).
58.
See Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree 327-47 (2000)
(discussing the “backlash” of people who feel brutalized by globalization); Thomas
Friedman, The World is Flat (2005) (discussing globalization’s effect on the
stability of certain cultural institutions and norms, including human rights
concepts).
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with free trade and development. Meanwhile, the internet and
cheaper and faster international travel have shrunk the world and
made international exchange at all levels much more prevalent.
While there are voices of opposition, to be sure, the trend line seems
clear. And as the world grows increasingly interdependent and
transnational, international human rights standards are likely to
command greater respect from our own domestic institutions. In the
midst of a paradigm shift, its significance is not always self-evident.59
We now know that the shift from a local to a national economy had
momentous implications for the constitutional balance of powers; it
seems possible that an equally historic shift may be taking place on
the global level now. And if that is true, Congress, the President, and
the courts will have to be increasingly open to international law
arguments in the years to come.
The third obstacle identified above is specific to immigration
law—the plenary power doctrine. As Judge Jack Weinstein has
written, however, the fact that the plenary power doctrine finds its
source in international law conceptions of sovereignty makes it
especially susceptible to developments in international law that
restrict the prerogative of the sovereign:
The Supreme Court has repeated that the basis for
Congress’s extremely broad power over aliens comes not
from the Constitution itself, but from international law. . . .
Since Congress’s power over aliens rests at least in part on
international law, it should come as no shock that it may be
limited by changing international law norms. . . . It is
inappropriate to sustain such plenary power based on a
1920 understanding of international law, when the 2002
60
conception is radically different.

The Tenth Circuit made a similar point in applying
international law limits to the power to detain indefinitely excludable
Mariel Cubans: “[W]e note that in upholding the plenary power of
Congress over exclusion and deportation of aliens, the Supreme
59.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“Not every epochal case has come in epochal trappings. Jones &
Laughlin did not reject the direct-indirect standard in so many words; it just said
the relation of the regulated subject matter to commerce was direct enough. But
we know what happened.”) (internal citations omitted).
60.
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on
other grounds, 329 F.3d. 51 (2d Cir. 2003). The district court cited numerous
Supreme Court decisions noting that the immigration power is founded on
international law conceptions of sovereignty, including Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892), and Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587-88.
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Court has sought support in international law principles. It seems
proper then to consider international law principles for notions of
fairness . . .”61 The concept that international law might affect
immigration law is not novel. Indeed, the domestic rules governing
asylum, withholding of deportation, and relief from removal under
the Convention Against Torture are each predicated on international
treaties.62 Thus, international human rights norms have already
been applied in the immigration setting, and therefore extending
those norms further may be easier here than in areas of the law that
have not traditionally been framed by international law.
These opportunities, taken together with the universalist
foundation of human rights, suggest an almost natural alliance
between international human rights and immigrants’ rights. The
considerable obstacles to progress should not be minimized, but the
opportunities are so significant, and the trend toward transnational
norms so strong, that it would be irresponsible not to seek better
integration of international human rights concepts into the effort to
protect and advance immigrants’ rights in the United States.

III. STRATEGIES
There is no one grand strategy for incorporating
international human rights into immigration law. Different forums
and different issues are likely to dictate different approaches.
Nonetheless, three broad themes emerge. In litigation, international
human rights law should be invoked primarily as a guide to the
interpretation of immigration statutes and of constitutional
protections for foreign nationals. In the political arena of public
advocacy, however, activists need not tie their arguments to the
interpretation of domestic statutes and constitutional provisions.
They should invoke international human rights norms directly. In
the public advocacy realm, it is particularly important to be
cognizant of the potential for bringing international pressure to bear
on the United States. Finally, advocates should give thought to
developing and supporting institutional mechanisms that might
encourage the political branches to consider the international human
rights implications of their actions proactively.
61.
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir.
1981).
62.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951,
art.1, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force April 22, 1924);
Convention on Torture, supra note 34.
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Litigation

When bringing international human rights claims in United
States courts, litigants are more likely to be successful if they can
frame their arguments in statutory or constitutional terms. Direct
invocation of international human rights laws is extremely difficult,
because, as noted above, most international human rights treaties
that we have ratified are said to be “non-self-executing,” meaning
that they do not create a private right of action absent express
Congressional legislation. In addition, as the Supreme Court noted
recently in Sosa, there are significant obstacles to raising customary
international law claims directly as a part of federal common law.
While a subset of such claims remains viable after Sosa, the Court
signaled that courts should be hesitant to find such claims actionable
absent a high degree of specificity and international consensus about
the right invoked.63
Courts have been more hospitable, however, to arguments
that international human rights norms are an appropriate guide for
statutory or constitutional interpretation. In 1987, for example, the
Supreme Court relied on our obligations under the Refugee
Convention in interpreting the “withholding” provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, although it justified doing so on
grounds of specific legislative intent—Congress had made clear that
it enacted the “withholding” provision precisely to bring the United
States into conformity with the Refugee Convention.64 In Ma v. Reno,
the Ninth Circuit relied on international law prohibitions against
arbitrary detention to construe immigration law to prohibit indefinite
detention of foreign nationals who were subject to final deportation
orders but could not be removed.65 District courts have also relied on
international protections of aliens and children to restrict the
deportation power, interpreting immigration law bars on
humanitarian relief for “criminal aliens” not to apply retroactively
where application of the bar would infringe on international law.66
The Supreme Court has long ruled that it is appropriate as a
63.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732, 738 (2004).
64.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
65.
Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818-20, 829 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated and
remanded on other grounds; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2002).
66.
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp.2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on
other grounds, 329 F.3d. 51 (2d Cir. 2003); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp.2d 206,
231 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Mojica v. Meissner, 970 F. Supp.2d 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). All
three of these decisions were written by Judge Weinstein.
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background rule of statutory construction to presume that Congress
seeks to legislate in conformity with our international obligations.
Thus, Chief Justice John Marshall famously declared in The
Charming Betsy that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”67 While Congress may—as a matter of domestic law—
override international law, this presumption means that absent a
clear conflict, courts should interpret federal statutes to conform to
international law obligations. To do so, the courts must by necessity
take account of and interpret applicable international law norms.
Invoking international law not directly, but as an aid to
statutory construction, is responsive to many of the concerns that
have been raised about more direct reliance on international human
rights claims. The concerns articulated in Sosa about the dangers of
generating common law through customary international law are
either not raised or muted substantially when international law is
invoked only as an interpretive guide. For example, the Court’s
concerns about the propriety of judicial lawmaking are not so sharply
at stake when the Court is interpreting a statute enacted by
Congress, for statuary construction has always been viewed as an
appropriate judicial function. Moreover, if Congress disagrees with
the Court, it is free to amend the statute to reflect that disagreement.
Thus, the exercise of this power is always subject to a democratic
check. Similarly, the concern about creating private rights of action
is not implicated where the courts rely upon international law not to
give rise to a lawsuit, but to inform the parameters of a federal
statute in the course of a lawsuit authorized by that statute. Thus,
using international human rights to inform interpretation of
immigration law raises far fewer concerns about judicial activism
than allowing parties to bring tort suits directly under customary
international law.
Statuary construction arguments also avoid the problem of
non-self-executing treaties. The fact that an international treaty is
not self-executing, while generally a bar to direct invocation of that
treaty by individual litigants, does not preclude an argument that
U.S. statutes should be interpreted in light of the treaty. The
decision to ratify a treaty without making it self-executing is a
67.
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804). The Supreme Court reiterated this injunction in Lauritzeen v. Larson,
345 U.S. 571 (1953), in which it held that admiralty law under the Jones Act
should be interpreted in conformity with international law.
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decision to deny litigants a private right to sue directly under the
treaty. But even where it is not self-executing, a signed and ratified
treaty obligation is nonetheless an obligation of the United States,
and therefore subject to the interpretive mandate of The Charming
Betsy.68 As one court has said, “Congress can be assumed, in the
absence of a statement to the contrary, to be legislating in conformity
with international law and to be cognizant of the country’s need . . .
to set an example with respect to human rights obligations.”69
Using international human rights law as a guide to the
interpretation of statutes is also consistent with a general feature of
the courts’ immigration law jurisprudence, which has often sought to
resolve cases through statutory construction.70 Thus, the Supreme
Court has rarely held any immigration law unconstitutional, but has
often interpreted immigration law to avoid constitutional problems.
It did so most recently in a pair of cases decided in its 2000 term. In
the first, Zadvydas v. Davis,71 the Court interpreted a statute that
appeared to authorize indefinite detention of foreign nationals
subject to deportation orders. Noting the serious constitutional
concerns that would arise were the statute so construed, the Court
interpreted it to require release of such foreign nationals after six
months if removal was not reasonably foreseeable in the future.72 In
the second, INS v. St. Cyr,73 the Court faced a statute that appeared
on its face to deny any judicial review to foreign nationals ordered
deported based on certain criminal convictions. The Court noted that
a serious constitutional issue would be raised if such persons were
denied habeas corpus, and interpreted the statute to preserve habeas

68.
See Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1163, 1180-82 and n.332
(1990); Louis Henkin, Evolving Concepts of International Human Rights and the
Current Consensus, 170 F.R.D. 275, 281 (1997); Paul Meehan, Combating
Restrictions on Immigrants’ Access to Public Benefits: A Human Rights
Perspective, 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 389, 409-10 (1997); Gordon Christenson, Using
Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analysis, 52 U.
Cin. Law. Rev. 3 (1983).
69.
Maria, 68 F. Supp.2d at 231; see also Beharry, 183 F. Supp.2d at 593.
70.
See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100
Yale L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court has consistently resolved
constitutional issues in the immigration setting through the tactic of statutory
construction).
71.
533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
72.
Id.
73.
533 U.S. 289, 300-02 (2001).
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corpus review.74
Thus, the Court is accustomed to interpreting immigration
statutes against their apparent meaning in order to avoid
constitutional difficulties. Arguments that immigration statutes
should also be construed to avoid clashes with international human
rights law should therefore sound familiar to judges deciding
immigration cases.
Using international human rights law to inform
constitutional interpretation poses a different and more controversial
issue. In the statutory construction setting, the argument is that
Congress should be assumed to have acted consistently with our
international law obligations, just as it should be assumed to have
acted consistently with its constitutional obligations. In the
constitutional setting, litigants are often invoking relatively recent
developments in international human rights law to inform an
evolving conception of constitutional rights. Originalists object that
international norms developed in the past fifty years have little or no
relevance to the meaning of constitutional provisions drafted two
hundred years ago. Others note that international human rights
norms do not have the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution, as
“we the people” did not define them, nor do “we the people” have the
power to change them if we dislike them. In addition, the stakes are
much greater with constitutional interpretation. When the courts
interpret a statute to conform to international law, it is always open
to Congress to disagree simply by amending the statute to make
clear its intention to override international law. But when the courts
interpret a constitutional provision in light of international law
developments, the political branches are more limited in their ability
to respond.
Nonetheless, as summarized above, the Supreme Court has
been open to relying on international law in interpreting a range of
constitutional provisions. Arguments for the relevance of
international law are strongest with respect to those constitutional
provisions that most clearly contemplate the development of evolving
norms. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishment,” for example, has long been understood to articulate an
evolving standard, and evidence from human rights treaties and
other countries’ practices may therefore be relevant evidence as to

74.

Id.
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what is considered “cruel and unusual” today.75 The Due Process
Clause has also been understood to express an evolving
understanding of protected liberties, and the Supreme Court has
looked to the practices of “English-speaking peoples”76 in assessing
what liberties were fundamental to “ordered liberty” and therefore
incorporated under the Due Process Clause and applicable to the
states.77 Thus, challenges to the fairness of deportation and detention
procedures in the immigration context can profitably look to
international standards to guide the interpretation of the
constitutional rights that apply.
Two examples of this approach from recent cases illustrate
the different ways in which international law arguments may be
employed. In Clark v. Martinez,78 the Supreme Court considered
whether the rule it established in Zadvydas v. Davis for deportable
aliens ought to be extended to excludable aliens. As noted above, the
Zadvydas ruling was based on statutory interpretation, but that
interpretation was in turn driven by a concern that the statute might
be unconstitutional were it interpreted to authorize indefinite
detention. In Clark, the government argued that even though the
same statute governs the detention of excludable and deportable
aliens, the statute need not be construed in the same manner for
excludable aliens because, as foreign nationals who have not been
admitted to the United States, they are not entitled to constitutional
protections.
The Court in Clark ultimately resolved the case by
interpreting the statute without reference to international law. It
reasoned that the same statute should not mean two different things
for two different categories of persons, where nothing in the statutory
language suggested that the excludable/deportable distinction was
relevant to Congress’s consideration.79 But one can imagine the
decision being written differently, relying on international law
arguments either to support the Court’s statutory construction or to
inform its constitutional analysis.
75.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (looking to
developments in international law to inform Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (same).
76.
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
77.
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 54 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
78.
543 U.S. 371 (2005).
79.
Id. at 725-26.
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First, the Court might have used international law to inform
its statutory construction. Assuming arguendo that foreign nationals
outside the United States do not have the same constitutional rights
as foreign nationals within the United States, they might well have
the same rights under international human rights law, which
generally does not distinguish between human beings based on
citizenship or location. If that were the case, then the Court would be
obliged to seek to interpret the statute to conform to international
law. Thus, where the Court in Zadvydas interpreted the detention
statute narrowly to avoid the constitutional concerns that would
arise were it read to authorize indefinite detention, so too the Court
in Clark could have interpreted the detention statute in the same
way in order to avoid the international human rights concerns that
would arise were it read to authorize indefinite detention. In this
argument, international human rights prohibitions on arbitrary
detention do the same work in guiding statutory construction as the
constitutional prohibition on arbitrary detention did in guiding
statutory construction in Zadvydas.
Second, international human rights law could have been
invoked to inform constitutional interpretation in Clark as a guide to
what due process itself requires for a foreign national in Martinez’s
position. In the 1950s, the Supreme Court ruled that foreign
nationals held at the border who had not entered the country were
not entitled, as a constitutional matter, to due process with respect to
their entry,80 and some have interpreted those decisions as holding
that foreign nationals outside the borders are not entitled to
constitutional protections.81 But that interpretation is contestable,82
and one could argue that Martinez should be entitled to the same
constitutional due process protections, at least with respect to
indefinite detention, as was Zadvydas. International human rights
law, which prohibits arbitrary detention without regard to the
citizenship status of the detainee, might be invoked to inform the

80.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
81.
The government has frequently advanced this view. See, e.g., Brief for
the Respondents, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334); Reply Brief for
the Petitioners, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2004) (No. 03-878).
82.
See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration
Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003, 1033 (2002) (arguing that cases such as United
States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy establish “only . . . that because non-citizens
have no liberty or property interest in entry they have no right to object to the
procedures used to exclude them.”).
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Court’s understanding of constitutional due process.
Cases like Clark, which raise claims on behalf of foreign
nationals who have never been admitted to the United States, are an
especially important locus for international human rights claims
precisely because U.S. constitutional law is often viewed as extending
few or no rights to foreign nationals in that status. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush83 to extend the writ of habeas
corpus to foreign nationals held as enemy combatants at
Guantanamo Bay suggests that the Supreme Court may be ready to
question some of its earlier precedents in this regard, or at least to
limit them to their facts. Arguments that international human rights
law demands that such persons be afforded basic protections may
offer important support in that development.
International human rights claims are also important to
pursue in the context of detentions and deportations involving people
who have been admitted to the United States. While these
individuals are generally protected by those provisions of the
Constitution that are not expressly limited to citizens, the content of
the rights extended to foreign nationals remains ambiguous. Because
domestic law already accords such individuals constitutional rights,
litigants may be less likely to advance international human rights
claims. But invocations of international law may nonetheless be
helpful as a guide to the formulation of the domestic guarantees at
issue.
In Turkmen v. Ashcroft,84 for example, a case I am working on
with the Center for Constitutional Rights, foreign nationals swept up
in the post-9/11 preventive detention campaign sued the Attorney
General and other government officials for violations of a wide range
of rights in connection with their detentions. They assert
constitutional and international human rights violations, and seek
money damages. The international human rights claims have
triggered the usual litany of threshold objections. But international
human rights principles might also inform the constitutional claims
we have advanced. For example, we argue that detaining foreign
nationals in immigration proceedings without evidence that they are
dangerous or a flight risk, and continuing to detain them after their
immigration cases have been finally resolved and they were ready
and willing to leave, violates due process because it constitutes
83.
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
84.
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307 (JG) (E.D.N.Y. filed April 2002).
See www.ccr-ny.org.
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arbitrary detention. The international human rights prohibitions
against arbitrary detention that we cite as an independent basis for
recovery might also be employed to buttress our constitutional
claims. The fact that international human rights treaties prohibit
arbitrary detention85 could be said to shore up the constitutional
arguments for a due process prohibition on arbitrary detention. And
international human rights decisions defining arbitrary detention
might provide guidance in outlining the contours of the Due Process
Clause.
The government argues that its detentions were authorized
by immigration law, but here, too, international human rights law
may be informative, much as it was in Ma v. Reno.86 If the
immigration law were interpreted to permit detention of foreign
nationals without evidence of danger or flight risk, and to permit
continued detention even after their immigration cases have been
resolved, it would conflict with international human rights norms
against arbitrary detention. Accordingly, under The Charming Betsy,
the court should interpret immigration law not to authorize such
detention.
International law claims may also have a less direct effect on
the interpretation of statutes. In Rasul v. Bush,87 the Guantanamo
enemy combatant case, lawyers for the families of the detainees
challenged the detentions on a variety of grounds, including
international law. One of their most prominent claims was that the
laws of war required that detainees be afforded some sort of hearing
to determine whether in fact they were enemy combatants.88 The
Supreme Court did not address these claims because it limited its
review to the threshold jurisdictional question whether the litigants
had any access to U.S. courts at all. But while the Court’s ultimate
decision reads as a wholly domestic interpretation of the habeas
corpus statute, its result was very likely driven by the international
human rights concerns raised by the Administration’s position that it
85.
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 49, and American Convention on Human
Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 7, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American
Convention], which both include provisions barring arbitrary detention.
86.
208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded on other grounds;
see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
87.
See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
88.
Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 23-29, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004) (No. 03-334), available at http:// www.ccr-ny.org/v2/rasul_v_bush
/legal/unitedStates/Brief%20for%20Petitioners%20Rasul%20v.%20Bush.pdf.
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has unfettered authority to impose indefinite incommunicado
detention without any legal limit.

B.

Public Advocacy

The Rasul litigation also illustrates the critical role that
international human rights law can play in the larger sphere beyond
the courtroom. The Guantanamo litigants prevailed not because of
the strength of their legal arguments in court—the majority’s
statutory construction argument is more than a little strained, as
Justice Scalia amply illustrates in his dissent—but because
Guantanamo had become an international embarrassment to the
United States. Until Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo was the symbol
around the world for what was wrong with the United States’ “war
on terror.” The Administration’s position that it could lock up any
national of any country indefinitely and incommunicado without so
much as a hearing was widely viewed as a blatant disregard of basic
principles of the laws of war and human rights law. That
international condemnation, reflected in open criticism from British
law lords, public demonstrations, highly critical foreign press
accounts, and diplomatic complaints, very likely played a role in the
Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case in the first place, and in its
ultimate decision to reject the Administration’s position of unfettered
detention power.
This example illustrates the opportunities that the current
situation may present for international human rights advocacy
outside the courts. As noted above, many of the Administration’s
worst initiatives from a human rights standpoint have been directed
at nationals of other countries, including the torture at Abu Ghraib,
the detentions at Guantanamo and in undisclosed overseas locations,
and the ethnic profiling and preventive detention campaigns at
home. Precisely because these initiatives are selectively targeted at
foreign nationals, they may be susceptible to challenge on grounds of
international human rights law, as the British law lords’ decision
discussed above demonstrates. Human rights law, predicated on
human dignity, does not distinguish between citizens and
noncitizens. Furthermore, the international community is likely to
take a special interest in burdens that the United States selectively
places on foreign nationals.
In part in reaction to these initiatives, international human
rights groups in the United States appear to have directed increased
scrutiny at the United States’ practices, and have been effective in
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issuing reports and shaping news coverage. Human Rights Watch
has played an especially key role in the fallout from Abu Ghraib.89 It
also issued an early report on the plight of the domestic detainees,90
the findings of which were confirmed some months later when the
Office of Inspector General issued its own comprehensive and highly
critical report on the treatment of immigration detainees after 9/11.91
Human Rights First released two excellent, comprehensive reviews
of the war on terrorism, one in September 2002, and the other six
months later, and now publishes an online review of the major
developments of interest to the human rights community in
connection with the war on terrorism.92 Amnesty International has
issued a major report on racial and ethnic profiling, and published
one of the first extensive reports on the mistreatment of domestic
detainees after 9/11.93
These efforts, which employ the traditional tactic of reporting
human rights abuses with the idea of “shaming” perpetrators into
respecting human rights norms, have been very effective in
galvanizing resistance to the Administration’s abuses, both here and
abroad. By speaking the language of international human rights,
rather than utilizing an exclusively domestic constitutional or
89.
Reed Brody, Human Rights Watch, The Road to Abu Ghraib (2004),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf; see also Kenneth Roth,
Human Rights Watch, Darfur and Abu Ghraib, available at http://www.hrw.org/
wr2k5/darfurandabughraib/darfurandabughraib/pdf.
90.
Cesar Muñoz Acebes, Human Rights Watch, Presumption of Guilt:
Human
Rights
Abuses
of
Post-September
11
Detainees
(2002),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf.
91.
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The
September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (April
2003) (released June 2, 2003).
92.
See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, A Year of Loss:
Reexamining
Civil
Liberties
Since
September
11
(2002),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/loss_mail.htm; Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law & Policy
Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties (2003), http://www.human
rightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/imbalance/imbalance.htm.
93.
For the report on racial and ethnic profiling, see Amnesty
International, U.S. Domestic Human Rights Program, Threat and Humiliation:
Racial Profiling, National Security, and Human Rights in the United States
(2004), http://www. Amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/index.do. For a report on
detainee mistreatment, see Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US
Attorney General—Amnesty International’s concerns relating to the post 11
September investigations (November 2001), http://web.amnesty.org/library
/index/engAMR511702001!Open.
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statutory framework for their analysis, these reports have greater
potential to be influential abroad, and thereby to galvanize
international opposition along the lines seen around Guantanamo
and Abu Ghraib.
Some of the most effective human rights work involves a
combination of public advocacy appealing to first principles with
litigation pursuing more narrow legal theories. Again, Guantanamo
is a prime example. The litigation served as a dramatic focal point for
opposition to the Administration’s policies, but human rights
advocates here and around the world simultaneously took on the
Administration in the public arena for flouting international law
principles and basic human dignity. In the end, that broader public
advocacy very likely played a significant role in the victory in the
Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
Administration’s position in turn galvanized still further opposition,
for it showed that concrete results are possible.94

C.

Institutional Reform

A third way to pursue international justice in the domestic
arena might be more institutional or process-oriented. Instead of
using traditional forums such as the media, public relations, and the
courts to advance human rights concerns, advocates might think
about building human rights consciousness into the processes of
political decision making. In a recent article in American Prospect,
Elisa Massimino describes a Clinton Administration innovation
designed to do just this. Executive Order 13107, issued in 1998,
sought to integrate human rights considerations into the domestic
policymaking agencies, so that rather than an afterthought raised by
human rights groups through reports, letters, or lawsuits, these
concerns became the everyday concern of the executive branch.95 As
94.
For law firms’ defense of Guantanamo Bay prisoners, see, e.g., Bill
Rankin, Lawyers fight for detainees; Ga. firm assails Guantanamo, The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, Nov. 30, 2005 (Allen & Overy’s representation of several
detainees). For statements calling for the closing of the Guantanamo Bay prison
camp, see, e.g., Biden Urges U.S. to Take Steps To Close Prison at Guantanamo,
New York Times, June 6, 2005 (noting that the prison camp serves as a
propaganda tool for terrorists); Cheney: U.S. Not Aiming to Close Guantanamo;
Other Republicans Say Prison is a Liability, Washington Post, June 13, 2005
(Senators Chuck Hagel, Mel Martinez, and Patrick Leahy call for closure of the
detention center).
95.
Exec. Order No. 13107 (Dec. 1998) (Implementation of Human Rights
Treaties) (committing the United States to enforcement of human rights treaties
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Massimino details, the Order created an Interagency Working Group
with a mandate to:
[P]repare treaty compliance reports to the United Nations;
respond to complaints about human-rights violations; vet
proposed
legislation
for
conformity
with
treaty
requirements; monitor and analyze state law and practice
on human rights; educate the public about human rights;
and conduct a yearly review of all U.S. reservations,
understandings, and declarations to see whether they can
be withdrawn or whether U.S. law should be altered to
96
make them unnecessary.

The Working Group apparently died under the Bush
Administration (ironically, just when it was most needed). But such
efforts to “incorporate” international human rights thinking into
domestic lawmaking and administration should be pursued wherever
possible. Perhaps the central challenge for international human
rights advocates focused on the United States is to get domestic
actors to take human rights seriously. As noted above, globalization
has set in motion a series of incentives that are likely to make
international law increasingly more familiar, and increasingly more
critical to domestic decision making. But it is also important to work
on this relationship from the inside out, by creating mechanisms and
actors within executive institutions whose role is precisely to promote
early consideration of human rights. Crises like Abu Ghraib—and
memos like the Office of Legal Counsel’s August 2002 torture
memo97—illustrate the critical importance of infusing policymaking
at the outset with greater sensitivity to international law concerns.
Initiatives like Executive Order 13107 offer that hope.98

IV. CONCLUSION
Advancing immigrants’ rights in the United States has never
been an easy task. While the Supreme Court has often paid lip
service to the notion that foreign nationals, at least those living in
and creating an Interagency Working Group to provide guidance, oversight, and
coordination), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo13107.htm.
96.
Elisa Massimino, Holding America Accountable, The American
Prospect, Oct. 2004, at A14.
97.
See Torture Memo, supra note 15.
98.
The Bush Administration’s indifference to this concept suggests that it
might be advisable to create such an office through legislation. Otherwise, the
only administrations that will have one will be those already inclined to pay
attention to international law.
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the United States, are entitled to the same basic rights as U.S.
citizens (some political participation rights aside), the nation’s record
of anti-immigrant abuse, and the Court’s record in reviewing that
abuse, does not live up to the Court’s promises. Foreign nationals are
often “the course of least resistance,” and the courts have rarely
stepped in to protect this class, one that by definition cannot protect
itself through the political process.
There are, to be sure, many reasons to be skeptical about how
much international human rights can do to improve the lot of foreign
nationals in the United States. First, the suspicion and fear of
immigrants in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11
threaten to taint any argument associated with immigrants’ rights
and to bring international human rights down with it. Second,
lawyers and judges in the United States have traditionally been
skeptical toward the entire domain of international human rights.
And third, immigration law in particular is especially impervious to
rights-based claims, whatever their provenance, because it is so
deeply defined by the notion that the immigration power is “plenary”
and that decisions regarding the fate of immigrants are largely a
matter of political discretion only loosely constrained by legal limits.
But there are also reasons for hope. The attacks of September
11 and their aftermath have made it clearer than ever that we are
dependent upon the good will of the rest of the world, and fidelity to
international human rights is critical to maintaining the legitimacy
of our security efforts. The skepticism of lawyers and judges is giving
way to the realities of a globalized world, in which transnational
exchange makes transnational norms more and more necessary. And
because immigration law’s “plenary power” finds its source in
international law conceptions of sovereignty, it is especially wellsuited to the limitations that international law is beginning to
impose on sovereignty, in particular through the last half-century’s
development of human rights.
In exploiting these opportunities, it seems best to take a
three-pronged approach: (1) argue narrowly in court, using
international human rights law principally as a guide to statutory
and constitutional interpretation rather than as an independent and
freestanding source of rights of action; (2) turn the human rights
activist’s more traditional tactics of “shaming” on the United States
itself, attempting to mobilize international opinion by invoking
internationally based claims; and (3) seek out ways to
“institutionalize” human rights concerns into the domestic
lawmaking and law enforcement policy process.
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History is likely to identify the current period as a paradigm
shift. We have the forces of history on our side. If we pursue these
aims through thoughtful invocations of international human rights,
we may yet rediscover the “idea of humanity” that Hermann Cohen
so eloquently described more than 100 years ago.

